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A TRIBUTE TO D. DORTCH WARRINER
The Editorial Board and Staff of the University of Richmond
Law Review respectfully dedicate this issue to the memory of D.
Dortch Warriner, 1929-1986. Before his untimely death, Judge
Warriner had served as United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Virginia for nearly twelve years. Judge Warriner received his legal education at the University of Virginia
School of Law, graduating in 1957. He practiced law in Emporia,
Virginia, before his nomination to the federal bench. In the following essay, delivered by Judge Warrineras a speech at the T.C.
Williams School of Law on March 19, 1985, he stated his views on
the role of the judiciary in our society. This essay, together with
the tributes of his colleagues, serves as a tribute to the Judge's
memory.
OF LAWS, MEN, AND JUDGES*
D. Dortch Warriner**
In the year 1774, during the period when our nation was in gestation, the patriot John Adams, with the eagerness of an expectant
father, proclaimed in his hometown newspaper, The Boston Globe,
that the great undertaking of creating the republic would result in
a new kind of government: "A government of laws, and not of
* This essay was originally delivered by Judge Warriner as a speech on March 19, 1985, at
the T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. Copyright 1985 by D. Dortch
Warriner, all rights reserved.

** Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 1974-86; B.A.,
1951, University of North Carolina; LL.B., 1957, University of Virginia.
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men."
I can almost hear you inwardly groan at once again being addressed in terms of this familiar old saw. But this old saw was a
radical, indeed, revolutionary idea in 1774. While I don't claim I
am privy to new or riveting insights on the subject, I do proclaim
the continuing and essential nature of the concept of the rule of
law. And I remind you, that was radical and revolutionary in 1774.
At the time of the American Revolution, the familiar form was a
government of men, such as a monarchy headed by a king or queen
enjoying absolute power. The monarch was, properly speaking, a
despot or a tyrant. The relationship between the people and the
government depended almost entirely upon the nature of the person who happened to be their ruler.
The ruler may have been a benevolent tyrant, that is, one who
used his power to do good and to achieve justice. The archetype in
the Anglo-Saxon heritage is, of course, King Arthur. On the other
hand, the ruler might have been a vicious tyrant, that is, one who
used his power in a cruel and oppressive manner. The modern
model for this type would be Josef Stalin. The people's livelihood,
or lifestyle-at least insofar as it was affected by their government-in either case depended upon the disposition of the person
who ruled.
To the early Greeks such a government, headed by a despot with
absolute power, was not considered an evil. To the contrary, the
Greeks considered such a government to be the best and most sensible attainable. In The Iliad, Homer wrote, "A multitude of rules
is not a good thing. Let there be one ruler, one kind." Plato envisioned a government of "philosopher kings" wielding absolute
power.
One reason why the early Greeks espoused a government of men,
entrusted with absolute power, was the tremendous potential in
such a government for the attainment of a good and just society.
Indeed, the despot would be chosen, by man or by the gods, because of his goodness, wisdom, and decency. These qualities of
goodness, wisdom, and decency, combined with the despot's absolute power, would, according to Plato, produce a just and contented society.
However, when we depend on despots for justice-even though
such despots be good people with good judgment-we necessarily
must submit ourselves to injustice, to bad despots with bad judg-
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ment or, even worse, to good despots with bad judgment.
More important, under a despotism we speak in vain when we
speak of the rights of man. There are no rights under a tyrant. At
best, in a tyrant's court, the quest is for justice.
But the justice sought in a tyrant's court is not defined by recourse to laws or by a concept of rights. A tyrant's justice is defined by the tyrant's notion of what justice should be. There is no
externally imposed certainty; there are no inviolable standards;
there are no individual rights. Rights, properly so called, exist only
when we seek to apply the law. For in the law there is certainty; in
the law there is an appeal, beyond the judge's sense of justice, to
his bounden duty to apply the law. Under law the nature of the
human being who happens to sit on the bench recedes in importance. The nature of the law itself becomes paramount.
The American colonists knew all too well the dangers of a government of men. Our forefathers were the subjects of a king; they
were the beneficiaries and they were the victims of his tyranny.
Our forefathers knew the dangers of tyranny because they could
see them, they could hear them, they could touch them. They
knew that absolute power, no matter in whom entrusted, was inherently and inevitably dangerous. As John Adams wrote to
Thomas Jefferson: "The fundamental article of my political creed
is that despotism, or unlimited sovereignty, or absolute power, is
the same in a majority of a popular assembly, an aristocratical
council, or oligarchical junto, and a single emperor."
With full knowledge of the inherent, inevitable evils of absolute
power entrusted to any one person or group of persons, the framers
of our Constitution set about deliberately to construct a government not of men but of laws. In a government of laws, absolute
power rests not with tyrants, be they few or many. In a government of laws, absolute power rests not even in the law itself. In a
government of laws, absolute power rests ultimately and over time
with the people.
Our government of laws was ingeniously crafted to disperse governmental power in such a way that no single governmental entity
or combination of governmental entities could ever enjoy absolute
power and thus impose upon the great body of the people a
tyranny.
May I remind you from your freshman civics class that to this
end the powers of government were divided between the states and
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the central government. The federal system was not formed for
convenience or even for efficiency; it was formed deliberately to
disperse power. The powers of the central government itself were
distributed among three co-equal branches of government-the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. An intricate and overlapping system of checks and balances among the coordinate branches
of the federal government was written into our supreme law, the
Constitution. The Constitution was made difficult to amend by
transient majorities. One of these three branches of one of these
governmental entities is the subject of this speech-the federal
judiciary.
The Supreme Court decided in 1803, in Marbury v. Madison,
that courts have the power and the authority to declare acts of
Congress unconstitutional. Marbury v. Madison established the
courts' power to make authoritative determinations of constitutional law. The exercise of this power has come to be known as
judicial review. So much is elementary and, in an ordered society,
exemplary. But even at that early date Chief Justice Marshall recognized the mischief which judicial review might give rise to. He
asked, "Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably
to the Constitution of the United States, if that Constitution forms
no rule for his government?"
Armed with the power of judicial review, the federal judiciary, in
a given case or controversy, is permitted, indeed required, to review any act of the other two branches of the federal government
and any act of the state governments to determine whether the act
accords with the Constitution of the United States. This power of
judicial review extends to the acts of the Congress, the President,
every officer and agency of the executive branch, every state governor, every state legislature, every state officer and agency, every
political subdivision of each state, and to large numbers of private
persons and corporations.
I mention the nature and the extent of the power of judicial review to emphasize how immense is the power vested in the federal
courts. The enormity of the power of the federal courts should impress upon us all the need for close, continuous, and suspicious
scrutiny to determine whether the federal judicial power is being
exercised properly-that is, whether the exercise of the federal judicial power comports with the requirement that ours be a government of laws and not of men.
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Recognizing that, under the rule of law, the law as adopted by
the people provides the standard for review, let us examine our
faithfulness to this standard.
A current biography of a former Chief Justice of the United
States and a recent newspaper interview with a sitting justice set
forth, quite candidly, a composite standard for judges to follow.
This standard is and has been followed by many on the federal
bench in recent decades.
Describing the former Chief Justice's jurisprudential approach,
his biographer, a distinguished professor of law just up Interstate
64 from here, observed with admiration and approbation that the
Chief Justice "equated judicial lawmaking with neither the dictates of reason, as embodied in established precedent or doctrine,
nor the demands imposed by an institutional theory of the judge's
role, nor the alleged 'command' of the constitutional text, but
rather with his own reconstruction of the ethical structure of the
Constitution." The Chief Justice's biographer noted that this
method of judging had been equated with "'dispensing law...
without any sensed limits of power except what was seen as the
good of society.'"
In the recent newspaper interview, the sitting Justice told the
reporter: "I think we are there to try to do justice to [the litigants]." The interviewer continued: The Justice "believes he is
there to do justice, not merely to oblige its doctrinal demands
. Unencumbered by precedent, [the Justice] votes instead in
...
accordance with his sense of fairness."
Such judicial activists premise their analysis on the assumption
that law is a fluid mix of established principles and changing social
values. They believe that judges should, in making their interpretation of the Constitution, transcend the traditional professional
limits of text and debate record and recognize the importance of
intuitive abstract values such as fairness and equality and liberty
and autonomy. Professor White at the University of Virginia has
recently written: "Judges have not been and cannot be confined, in
their interpretations of the Constitution, to the explicit words of
the constitutional text or to the original intentions of the framers
* .*. . [T]he dimensions of moral reasoning of a court opinion is its
crucial source of legitimacy, and that dimension cannot be reduced
to 'professional' techniques of interpretation."
To summarize, the standard attributed to these two Justices is
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that federal judges, and more particularly the Justices of the Supreme Court, have a mission. That mission is to do justice as they
see it. Justice is to be achieved through their individual and collective sense of fairness, compassion, decency, goodness, and mercy.
They are not to be confined by what are sometimes known as technicalities or by pre-existing acceptance of what is just. Their role is
to be the people's guardian; they are there to light the way, to emblazen the path for truth and justice. Necessarily then, they cannot
be restrained by old-fashioned traditions, by history, by reason, by
acts of Congress, or even, in an extreme case, by the Constitution
itself. Their preeminent mission to do justice must come first.
How glorious it all sounds. Indeed, how glorious it is! The vision
is of the kind, wise, and benevolent judge as our guardian, our
grandfather, always there to right the wrong and to uphold the
weak. The idea is based upon goodness and decency; it is permeated with equality and fraternity.
But we cannot help but be reminded of the sirens' song: though
forewarned, Ulysses could not resist that haunting call. All of
us-judges, lawyers, citizens-also find it difficult, well nigh impossible, to resist such a haunting call: the call to do justice. But resist
we must if we are to maintain our liberty. Resist we must if the
genius of the American Revolution is to be preserved.
George Washington, in his farewell address, issued this emphatic
warning:
If in the opinion of the People, the distribution of the Constitutional
powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way in which the Constitution designates. But let there
be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be
the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free
governments are destroyed.
Every time a judge uses his or her office, not to determine and
apply the law, but instead to enforce his or her ideas of fairness or
justice, that judge is guilty of usurpation and of tyranny; that
judge, as President Washington realized, destroys some of our
freedom.
An astute political observer, Harry Downs, of Atlanta recently
wrote in Judicaturemagazine, the journal of the American Judicature Society:
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If a Republic is a society which entrusts the powers of government
to representatives elected and responsible to the people, then judicial law-making is the very antithesis of republican government.

The basic premise of republican government is not that a people
will always be governed best, but that they will be governed as they
then think best. Consent of the governed is, therefore, a fundamental premise of republican government. Judges, when acting within
the Constitution, affirm the principle of consent, since the Constitution was adopted by the people acting through representative bodies, and its enforcement implements that consent. When they act
outside the Constitution, however, judges make law through a process that does not depend on-or even seek-that consent. Hence
the practice of judicial law-making violates a first premise of republicanism: consent of the governed.

Perhaps not as basic to our understanding of the republic as the
consent of the governed, but clearly fundamental to our own peculiar system in this country, is the doctrine of separation of powers.
The framers, though well aware of the tradition of judge-made
common law, allocated to the Congress all legislative authority.
When Congress adopts legislation we may conclude that the competing interests and attempts at compromise and conciliation have
eventuated and have been reconciled in a particular manner. When
courts venture to reinterpret and even rewrite legislation they are
effectively destroying the bargain reached in Congress. If the compromising parties can be denied the benefits of their bargains, they
lose all incentive to achieve consensus in the first place.
You may argue that a court would never venture to rewrite legislation. Yet the Supreme Court obviously did that in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Let me share
with you the views of Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion:
While I share some of the misgivings expressed in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, . . . concerning the extent to which the legislative
history of Title VII clearly supports the result the court reaches today, I believe that additional considerations, practical and equitable,
only partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress,
support the conclusion reached by the court today ....
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Id. at 209 (citation omitted).
In Weber the court deliberately misconstrued the Act to hold
that it was not unlawful to discriminate against an individual with
respect to his employment if the victim of the discrimination is a
white male and the discrimination is part of a private program to
improve minority opportunities. The plain language of the statute
and the intent of Congress as reflected in the legislative history
were both flatly contrary to the Weber holding.
Another aspect of the invasion of our principle of separation of
powers is viewed when the void of congressional inaction is filled
by judicial legislation. Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton are both
clear examples of the judicial filling of what was perceived as a
legislative void. A political-minded Congress that perceives a
means whereby it can avoid cracking the tough nuts will more and
more pass them on to the courts. This shifting of law-making responsibility, whether it be conscious or unconscious, is reflected in
the fact that most of the truly far-reaching and fundamental
changes in our laws, with which you are familiar, were enunciated
by the Supreme Court of the United States rather than the Congress of the United States.
Another of our fundamental concepts is that a government must
protect minority rights. A judiciary that has refrained from lawmaking and has not laid waste its prestige in activists' pursuits, a
judiciary which is perceived as being "above politics" enhances its
ability to facilitate the orderly resolution of conflict between majority rule and minority rights.
Consistent with the idea that we are governed by the consent of
the governed, but containing a slightly different twist on that idea,
is the idea that the legislative process should be responsive to the
electorate. Judicial legislation, of course, lacks appropriate responsiveness to the popular will. Judicial legislation is bereft of the
benefits of hearings, open floor debates, consultations with constituents, lobbying by various groups. Judges are not free to investigate any matters that require attention. They must decide only
cases or controversies brought before them by litigants. The judges
do not seek out and question witnesses. They must be content to
hear the witnesses brought forward by the parties and listen to the
evidence elicited through the questions asked by counsel. Generally speaking judges are not empowered to reach compromises between competing interests. They must decide the case one way or
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the other. Having made a bad decision as to what the law is, judges
cannot simply correct it at the next session. They must await an
open violation and the initiation of litigation before they can act to
reverse an erroneous decision.
Professor White, the judicial activist apologist, is aware of this
problem, and his solution is extraordinary:
I believe that the American public has a meaningful device to signify
its collective disapproval of ...

a court decision ....

[T]he public

can simply not abide by the decision. Decisions of the court require
implementation; they can be subverted by the implementers or
those affected by the decision ....

A judgment by segments of the

public that [refuses to] follow a court's decision is the equivalent of
a judgment.

.

. [to] . . . vote a legislator out of office.

As we readily recognize, that way lies anarchy and that way lies
the destruction of all minority rights. Where will minorities go to
school if the majority simply refuse to obey school attendance or
busing orders? Where will they eat or sleep if restauranteurs or
motel keepers simply refuse accommodations?
Paul Brest, a leading spokesman for an activist interpretation of
the Constitution, said:
Many scholars and judges reject the major premise, that constitutional interpretation should depend chiefly on the intent of those
who framed and adopted such a provision ....

[W]hatever the

framers' expectations may have been, broad Constitutional guarantees require the court to discern, articulate, and apply values that
are widely and deeply held by our society.
It would appear impossible to describe an issue more apt for legislative treatment than one that is "widely and deeply held by our
society." If it indeed be widely and deeply held by our society we
could assuredly expect legislators to respond and in so doing reach
a balance with other widely and deeply held values. Legislators are
equipped and intended for this specific task. Judges are neither
equipped nor intended to discern, articulate, and apply values.
They are equipped and intended to discern, articulate, and apply
the law.
A contrasting view was expressed by Justice Harlan in Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970):
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When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of
the framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to
which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the
constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect.
The ugly spectre of so-called "substantive due process" is again
being seen about the land. Thought to be dead and buried, it has
been resurrected by the activist judges to be used against acts of
the state which the judges believe to be wrong. Once it was the
liberals who decried substantive due process when it gored their
ox. Now they gore with alacrity. In 1963 in Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 731, substantive due process was at its nadir. The
Court referred to:
our abandonment of the "vague contours" of the due process clause
to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise. We have returned to the original constitutional principle that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of the legislative bodies, who are elected to pass
laws.

In the twenty-odd years since 1963 when the Court announced
its abandonment of the vague contours of the due process clause,
we have seen repeatedly, to the point of the commonplace, the
Court discerning finely etched laws in those vague contours.
It may be argued that we cannot turn back the clock but in 1938
in Erie Railway v. Tompkins, the Court turned back the clock of
the 1842 holding in Swift v. Tyson. Justice Brandeis in Erie
branded the Swift v. Tyson doctrine as an "unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse
of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to
correct."
Addressing a judge's resort to his "individual sense of justice,"
Cardozo wrote, "That might result in a benevolent despotism if the
judges were benevolent men. It would put an end to the reign of
law."
Our system is committed to equal justice under law, not to Justices above the law. Judges are not authorized to revise the Constitution in the interest of "justice."
Alexander Hamilton agrees:
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Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding. . . and no
presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant
their representatives, in a departure from it, prior to such act.
The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
Let us examine again Professor White, an advocate of judicial
activism, as he confesses its attributes, quoting from his biography
of Chief Justice Warren:
Warren had based his purported usurpation of legislative prerogatives on an interpretation of the Constitution that was neither faithful to its literal text nor consistent with the context in which it had
been framed. He had substituted homolies for doctrinal analysis.
In none of the leading activist Warren Court decisions was a constitutional mandate obvious. Brown v. Board of Education reversed a
long-established precedent on the basis of social science evidence.
Baker v. Carr found a judicial power to review the political judgments of legislators when none had previously existed. When one
divorces Warren's opinions from their ethical premises, they evaporate ....
They are individual examples of [Warren's own] beliefs
leading to judgments.

Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren were at one in their
guideline to constitutional interpretation. Douglas frankly avowed
that in constitutional adjudication "the gut reaction of a judge...
was the main ingredient of his decision." White placed Warren's
method in somewhat more elegant terms. What Douglas had referred to as a "gut reaction" White called "the ethical imperatives
that guided Warren as a judge." He concluded, however, that these
"ethical imperatives" reflected Warren's personal morality.
Justice Story in his commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States commented:
Nor should it ever be lost sight of, that the government of the
United States is one of limited and enumerated powers, and that a
departure from the true import and sense of its powers is pro tanto
the establishment of a new Constitution. It is doing for the people
what they have not chosen to do for themselves. It is usurping the
functions of a legislator ....
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Now I do not mean to suggest that judges who disregard the law
and the Constitution to do what they believe is decent, wise, good,
and just are by their nature evil persons. Quite the contrary is true.
Evil or bad persons are fairly easy to spot and are as easily struck
down. Persons who are appointed to the bench are almost always
persons of good character and decent behavior.
But the tyrant need not be an evil man or have an evil purpose
to be a precursor of evil. Indeed as I mentioned earlier, one of the
most dangerous of tyrants is the good man with bad judgment. As
Sophocles noted, "How dreadful it is when the right judge judges
wrong!" We accept unintended evil from good persons much more
readily, and unsuspectingly, than from overtly evil persons.
C.S Lewis, the late Christian philosopher, wrote:
The modern state exists not to protect our rights but to do us good
or make us good-any way to do something to us or make us something. Hence the new name "leaders" for those who were once "rulers." We are less their subjects than their wards, pupils, or domestic
animals. There is nothing left of which we can say to them, "Mind
your own business." Our whole lives are their business.
At another point, Lewis said:
Of all the tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its
victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under
robber barons than under omnipotent moral busy-bodies.
When we think of the government as the final source of protection from the evils of men, we must remember that it was the government that killed both Christ and Socrates, two of the freest and
grandest minds of Western civilization.
The good judge's tyranny, even though it be benevolent, comes
from the displacement of the people's law. Every time the judge
substitutes his own ideas of decency and fairness for those of the
people as embodied in their law, the judge necessarily demonstrates his own, perhaps unconscious, mistrust and disrespect for
the people and for their law.
Thomas Jefferson correctly observed that:
Men by their constitutions are naturally divided into two parties: (1)
Those who fear and distrust the people and wish to draw all powers
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from them into the hands of the higher classes. (2) Those who identify themselves with the people, have confidence in them, cherish
and consider them as the most honest and safe, although not the
most wise, depository of the public interests. In every country these
two parties exist; and in every one where they are free to think,
speak, and write, they will declare themselves.
If we are to be a government of laws and not of men, if we are to
remain free and are to continue to promote our liberty, we must
renew our trust in the people and manifest our confidence in and
respect for their judgment as embodied in their law. Though they
may not be the most wise, they surely are the most reliable and
safe repository of power.
We must not subscribe to the view that America needs a secular
savior, whether in the form of a president, or in the form of a Supreme Court, or in the form of any federal judge.
Jefferson wrote that "the tree of liberty must be refreshed from
time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants." Now, I am
prompt to interject that I do not think that Jefferson should be
taken literally. I do not advocate the assassination of judges. Such
a program could easily get out of hand and shorten my own term
on the bench!
But civil and constitutional applications of Jefferson's axiom in
the present context can be seen all around us. For instance, a decade ago there were demands for the impeachment of a president
believed to have put himself above the law. A decade before that,
there were efforts to mount an impeachment of a Chief Justice
whom some believed had disregarded the law.
Today, there are bills in Congress pursuant to article III, section
2, of the Constitution, to remove jurisdiction from the federal
courts in areas where it is believed judges have been guilty of tyranny-that is, guilty of attempts to do justice in accordance with
their own political or philosophical ideology.
There are also movements in the Congress and in state legislatures for amendments to the Constitution effectively to repeal certain decisions of the Supreme Court which are thought to have
rent the fabric of the law. More drastically, a substantial number
of the states have called for a Constitutional Convention.
While I do not have occasion to advocate a position on any of
these issues, I do state to you my firm belief that these various
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movements are the people's direct response to what is perceived as
decades of judicial tyranny. They are the people's response to a
government that has tended toward a government of men and not
of laws. The people are demanding an end to this tendency toward
tyranny and a resurrection of a government of laws.
So prevalent is our current notion that judges are, and should
be, our guardians, that persons who expound the fundamental necessity of a government of laws, and oppose a government of men,
are considered by many today to be radical and revolutionary. Paradoxically, the issue has come full circle.
It is fitting that during the decade following our independence
bicentennial and preceding the bicentennial of the adoption of our
Constitution, we should again take up the cause of revolutionary
patriots and again demand a government of laws. It is only under a
government of laws that our individual rights may be enjoyed, our
personal liberties preserved, and America remain the land of the
free.

